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EMINENT DOMAIN AND OIL PIPELINES: A SLIPPERY 
PATH FOR FEDERAL REGULATION 
Natalie Jensen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Oil pipelines are controversial. The Keystone XL Pipeline, poised to 
be the largest oil pipeline in North America, has generated opposition 
from tens of thousands, including those who marched on the White 
House and even His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who urged President 
Obama to focus on renewable energy solutions instead.1 Civil rights 
came under attack when the Dakota Access Pipeline, which is planned 
to run from North Dakota through South Dakota and Iowa to Illinois, 
demolished sacred Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sites.2 Protests of the 
Dakota Access Pipeline became front-page news as law enforcement 
turned tear gas and water hoses on the crowds standing in solidarity 
with the Native Americans affected by the pipeline’s construction.3 
However, another source of controversy for oil pipelines that is 
becoming increasingly contentious is private oil companies’ use of 
eminent domain to acquire land on which the pipelines will be built. 
Oddly enough, this controversy crosses political lines and creates 
unusual bedfellows. For example, those who are in favor of 
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 1. Ryan Harrigan, Transcanada’s Keystone XL Pipeline: Politics, 
Environmental Harm, & Eminent Domain Abuse, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 207, 
208 (2012). 
 2. Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in The Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NAT. 
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/
514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight 
[http://perma.cc/U5N4-A6UC]. 
 3. Id. 
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strengthening domestic energy production from traditional carbon-
based sources often strongly oppose eminent domain as an overstep of 
governmental power.4 On the other end of the spectrum, those who 
generally support the use of eminent domain to redevelop blighted 
areas often do not want to expand domestic fuel production, choosing 
instead to focus on renewable energy sources.5 
Oil pipeline siting is not federally regulated unless the pipeline is 
sited on land under federal jurisdiction.6 Therefore, state law governs 
oil pipeline siting.7 However, state laws conflict in their treatment of 
oil pipelines. To build oil pipelines, oil companies must receive 
easements from private landowners to build on their land. Depending 
on the state, oil companies may be subject to permitting and 
environmental review by state agencies in order to begin construction 
of the pipeline.8 Some landowners refuse to accept the oil pipeline 
company’s compensation for their land and refuse to grant the pipeline 
company an easement for the pipeline. In most states, the oil company 
may then use eminent domain to take the land, circumventing the 
landowner’s property rights.9 In such circumstances, landowners have 
sued, declaring an unconstitutional taking by a private company. This 
area of the law is largely unsettled due to a lack of consistency from 
state to state. Therefore, if a company intends to build an oil pipeline, 
like the Keystone XL Pipeline or the Dakota Access Pipeline, and 
landowners object, the company will be subject to the eminent domain 
laws of each state and municipality along the intended route. Overall, 
this suggests that the current landscape is untenable. 
                                                                 
 4. Phil McKenna, Anti-Eminent Domain but Pro-Pipelines: A Republican 
Conundrum, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 4, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/29022016/eminent-domain-oil-pipelines-keystone-xl-republican-donald-
trump-ted-cruz [http://perma.cc/CZ9V-WTPW]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Student Corner: Regulating Energy – Oil, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
https://www.ferc.gov/students/regulation/oil.asp (“FERC does not regulate the 
oversight of oil pipeline construction. The authority rests with states and local 
jurisdictions.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines: 
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L. 
J. 409, 423 (2016). 
 9. Id. 
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Many environmentalists oppose the use of eminent domain for the 
siting, or plan for construction and development of routes, for oil and 
natural gas pipelines, as these forms of energy are nonrenewable and 
therefore arguably not in the public’s best interest.10 However, eminent 
domain may be the answer to promoting a transition to renewable 
energy sources, such as wind power, solar power, and hydropower.11 
Renewable resources such as solar power and wind power are usually 
built far away from population centers both because these resources 
are more abundant and because there is more land on which to site the 
generating source.12 This is problematic, as the supply of electricity 
must be delivered to the population centers with high energy demand 
by a high-voltage transmission system, “which has become 
increasingly stressed in recent years as growing demand has 
outstripped capacity.”13 As with oil pipelines, states have various 
regulating entities that focus on environmental aspects or economic 
aspects of a proposed transmission line or base permitting on voltages, 
length of the proposed transmission line, or benefit to the 
community.14 A one-regulation-fits-all approach does not seem ideal 
                                                                 
 10. Nives Dolsak et al., The Big Fight Over the Dakota Access Pipeline, 
Explained, WASH POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/20/this-is-why-environmentalists-are-targeting-energy-
pipelines-like-the-north-dakota-project/?utm_term=.c007fd7d9dd7 
[http://perma.cc/XD4X-XZTU]. 
 11. Herman Trabish, How New Transmission can Unlock 10 Times More 
Renewables for the Eastern U.S., AM. FOR A CLEAN ENERGY GRID (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://cleanenergygrid.org/how-new-transmission-can-unlock-10-times-more-
renewables-for-the-eastern-u-s/ [http://perma.cc/9HA3-UDPW]. 
 12. See Brad Plumer, These Maps Show the Best Places to Put Solar and Wind 
Power. (It’s Not Where You Think.), WASH. POST (July 15, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/15/these-maps-show-
the-best-places-to-put-solar-and-wind-power-its-not-where-you-
think/?utm_term=.ec6f4537a113 [http://perma.cc/TTJ5-D4H2]. 
 13. THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., What You Need to Know About 
Energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nap.edu/read/12204/#slide3. This 
stress may cause disruptions in power services, as seen during the blackout in 2003 
that affected 50 million people from Ohio to New York to Canada. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., A.R.S. §§ 40-360.06 -360.07(B) (Arizona statute requiring above-
ground transmission lines with a capacity of 115,000 volts or more to meet numerous 
factors similar to those for a power plant construction); Florida Transmission Line 
Siting Act, §§403.52-5365, F.S., and Rule 62-17, F.A.C. (Florida law requiring 
transmission lines 230 kV or larger, cross a county line, or are greater than 15 miles 
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at first glance because both clean and dirty energy are regulated 
differently, which is understandable given the differences in the source 
of energy,15 safety concerns,16 and uses of energy.17 But, a centralized 
regulatory framework could advance a modern and innovative energy 
policy that advocates for renewable energy while considering the 
transition from nonrenewable sources. 
This Note attempts to address the patchwork of state pipeline 
regulation and proceeds in three parts. First, Section I describes why 
private companies are allowed to use eminent domain. This section 
tracks how private companies acting in specific contexts are 
considered “public uses.” Such contexts include when companies act 
as common carriers, public utilities like electric transmission lines or 
natural gas pipelines, and private companies involved in economic 
developments. Next, Section II explains the conflicting state eminent 
domain laws that treat oil pipelines differently to either grant or deny 
the oil companies the right to build their pipelines. Finally, Section III 
proposes a “cooperative federalism” model that would allow state 
autonomy under a federal regulatory framework. In such an 
arrangement, states could elect to treat oil companies as private 
companies and deny them the right of eminent domain or adhere to the 
baseline national standards for eminent domain, which would include 
a clear showing of “public use” or necessity before the pipeline 
                                                                 
in length to receive approval by the Department of Environmental Protection, state 
and local governments, and a final decision by the Governor and Cabinet sitting at 
the Siting Board). Edison Electric Institute, State Generation & Transmission Siting 
Directory: Agencies, Contacts, and Regulations 5, 26-28 (Oct. 2013) 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/State_Generation_Tra
nsmission_Siting_Directory.pdf. 
 15. See Energy Sources, ENERGY.GOV, https://energy.gov/science-
innovation/energy-sources (last visited Nov. 27, 2017). Water, photovoltaic rays, oil, 
and wind (all sources of energy) have different physical qualities and are regulated 
differently at the federal and state level. Compare What FERC Does, FERC (May 
24, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp with What FERC Does Not Do, 
FERC (May 24, 2016), https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp. 
 16. See Elisa Wood, The Dangers of Energy Generation, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
WORLD (May 25, 2011), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/print/
volume-14/issue-3/solar-energy/the-dangers-of-energy-generation.html 
[http://perma.cc/XC4H-62NK]. 
 17. See generally THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., What You Need to 
Know About Energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nap.edu/
read/12204/#slide1. 
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company could use eminent domain. Ultimately, this model would 
create a framework that is inclusive of both state preferences and the 
renewable energy sector. 
I. EMINENT DOMAIN 
The Fifth Amendment gives the government the right to take private 
land for a public use with just compensation to the landowner, 
commonly referred to as the power of eminent domain.18 According to 
scholars, no legislative history exists to indicate the drafters’ 
interpretation of “public use” in the Fifth Amendment.19 Although no 
“public use” provision exists in English laws either, historically, the 
government’s exercise of eminent domain was uncontested for public 
highways or mills that had wide-spread benefits.20 However, with the 
industrial expansion of the nineteenth century, landowners began 
seeking legal remedy for what they believed to be unconstitutional 
takings for uses such as government buildings or railroad expansion.21 
The Supreme Court was forced to decide whether “public use” would 
narrowly apply only to land actually used by the public, or whether it 
would apply broadly to land that was for a more general public 
purpose.22 The Court decided on a broad view of “public use” that 
encompasses a public purpose generally, but the Court also granted 
deference to the states to decide the more tailored purposes for their 
constituents.23 
The federal government has “power to appropriate lands or other 
property within the States for its own uses, and to enable it to perform 
its proper functions.”24 The power of eminent domain has enabled the 
                                                                 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the definition of “just compensation” has been 
an area of contention, this Note focuses on the definition of “public use.” 
 19. See William Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. 
REV. 553, 591-95 (1972); MICHAEL WOLF ALLEN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 
79F.03 (2017). 
 20. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1905); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton 
Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916) (citing Clark, 
198 U.S. at 367-68). 
 24. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875) (holding the government had 
the right to take land for the construction of a customs building and post office). 
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government to provide transportation routes, water supply, national 
parks, naval bases, and large infrastructure projects to citizens as those 
public needs arose.25 This implied power is conferred onto states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment and through state constitutions 
that also condition government takings on the premise of a “public 
use” and on payment of just compensation to the landowner.26 Over 
time, the legal confines of eminent domain that once theoretically 
protected landowners from unconstitutional takings have been 
broadened as the definition of what qualifies as a “public use” has 
expanded. The definition of “public use” has evolved to include uses 
that arguably only benefit private actors, but within a broad scope 
could possibly affect the public. The definition of “public use” is 
important in determining whether an oil pipeline should qualify as a 
public use, as a broad definition may allow or exclude private oil 
companies. 
This section examines how the Court’s definition of “public use” 
intertwines with private entities seeking to use eminent domain. When 
analyzing the private benefit from governmental power of eminent 
domain, it is important to look at the legal history surrounding three 
areas where private entities have the power of eminent domain. First, 
common carriers’ use of eminent domain is explained, showing how 
private actors were given the right of eminent domain for large 
infrastructure transportation projects, and how federal regulations 
shaped the landscape of common carriers’ operation. Next, the 
relationship between electric utilities’ use of eminent domain and state 
and local government is explained. While utility companies are 
regulated differently based upon the type of energy transmitted, 
virtually all traditional types of energy have the power of eminent 
domain, either through federal or state governments. Lastly, the 
general “public use” doctrine is explained, showing the development 
                                                                 
 25. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, DEPT. OF JUST. ENVT. & 
NAT. RESOURCES DIV. https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-
domain; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884) (holding the 
government had the right to acquire property from landowner, with just 
compensation, to provide drinking water to a city via aqueducts); Shoemaker v. 
United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893) (holding Congress had the right to acquire 
property from landowners, with just compensation, for the designation of land as a 
national park). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
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of economic uses that allow the government to transfer land from one 
private landowner to another. 
A. Eminent Domain for Common Carriers 
Railroad companies have the power of eminent domain in their 
capacity as common carriers.27 Rooted in common law, the rights, 
privileges, duties, and liabilities of common carriers differ with those 
of private carriers, also called contract carriers.28 A common carrier 
“must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of 
goods for hire as a business. . . .”29 Furthermore, designation as a 
common carrier depends “not . . . upon whether its charter declares it 
to be such, . . . but upon what it does.”30 Factors that determine a 
common carrier designation include: regular service, unpredictable 
and changeable customers, business solicited from the general public, 
and the carrier’s responsibilities defined by regulations.31 Factors that 
determine a private carrier include: occasional service, identifiable and 
stable clientele, targeted business solicitation, and responsibilities 
defined by contract.32 One of the most important duties railroads have 
as common carriers is a duty to provide nondiscriminatory service.33 
The railroad industry was the first federally-regulated private 
industry. Seeking to take a stand against monopolies, in 1887 Congress 
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”).34 The ICA established 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”), which set reasonable 
rates for the railroad industry.35 At that time, most states allowed 
                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 24311 (2014) (“Amtrak may acquire by eminent 
domain . . . interests in property necessary for intercity rail passenger 
transportation.”). 
 28. Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common 
Carriage, The Columbia Insititute for Tele-Information, Telecommunications Policy 
(1994). 
 29. Fish v. Chapman & Ross, 2 Ga. 349 (1847). 
 30. United States v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 249 U.S. 296, 304 (1919). 
 31. Noam, supra note 28. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Kevin M. Sheys, Strategies to Facilitate Acquisition and Use of Railroad 
Right of Way by Transit Providers. Transit Cooperative Research Program, TRANSP. 
RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST, 3 (Sept. 1994). 
 34. Interstate Commerce Act, OUR DOCUMENTS, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=49. 
 35. Id. 
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railroad companies the same power of eminent domain given to state 
governments, but some states limited railroads’ use of eminent domain 
by requiring landowner consent in certain circumstances.36 Most aid 
for building the railroad infrastructure in the United States came from 
private investors, but the government did provide assistance through 
land grants,37 loans, and states’ transfer of eminent domain power.38 
The ICA was reversed by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), which transferred regulatory 
power of railroad siting and construction to the Surface Transportation 
Board (“STB”).39 The ICCTA preempts state and local laws that 
manage or govern rail transportation,40 specifically, the “construction, 
acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of rail 
tracks.”41 Accordingly, siting of railroads, including eminent domain 
proceedings, are regulated by the STB and not the state.42 
Under the ICA railroads and oil pipelines shared a distinction as 
common carriers after passage of the 1906 “Hepburn Amendment.”43 
Oil pipeline regulation was based on railroad regulation, even though 
                                                                 
 36. See Larry W. Thomas, Railroad Legal Issues and Resources, TRANSP. 
RESEARCH BOARD, LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST 2 at 435 (2015); see also Hairston v. 
Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 608 (1908) (holding railroad’s condemnation 
of property for conducting railroad business lawful); Buck v. District Court for 
Kiowa County, 199 Colo. 344, 348, 608 P.2d 350, 351-52 (1980) (holding railroad’s 
condemnation of property adjoining railroad lawful); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 
6005 (2014) (granting eminent domain to railroads but prohibiting takings of 
dwellings, meetinghouses, or burial grounds without consent). 
 37. See Landmark Legislation: Pacific Railway Act of 1862, U.S. SENATE 
HISTORICAL OFFICE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
generic/PacificRailwayActof1862.htm. 
 38. Clarence Carson, Throttling the Railroads 2: Aiding the Railroads: 1830 – 
1871 FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATION (June 1, 1970), 
https://fee.org/articles/throttling-the-railroads-2-aiding-the-railroads-1830-1871/. 
 39. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-16106 (2014). 
 40. The Federal Laws Applicable to Railroads, THE ALBEMARLE COUNTY LAND 
USE LAW HANDBOOK, Ch. 33 (March 2012), (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of 
Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 157-58 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 41. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2014). 
 42. See Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding a Vermont environmental land use statute that could deny a railroad’s 
construction was preempted by ICCTA). 
 43. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines: 
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L. 
J. 409, 410 (2016). 
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they served vastly different purposes.44 In The Pipe Line Cases, the 
Court made a distinction between oil pipelines as common carriers and 
private carriers by defining private carriers as pipelines “serving the 
sole purpose of moving the owner’s oil from its own wells to its own 
refinery, even if the movement crossed state boundaries.”45 However, 
the purpose of the ICA’s designation of oil pipelines as common 
carriers was to regulate oil rates, not to determine other liabilities and 
rights as a common carrier, such as the right of eminent domain.46 In a 
case determining the ICC’s right to request information from a 
pipeline, Justice Jackson stated that while the pipeline would be 
subject the ICC’s request, the oil pipeline was “not a common carrier 
in the sense of the common law carrier for hire.”47 In interpreting the 
legislative history of the ICA the Supreme Court reasoned, 
[t]here is little doubt, from the legislative history, that the 
Act was passed to eliminate the competitive advantage 
which existing or future integrated companies might possess 
from exclusive ownership of a pipe line. This evil could not 
have been reached by bringing within the coverage of the 
Act only those pipe lines who were common carriers for hire 
in the common-law sense. . . . Hence the bill as finally 
enacted was clearly intended “to bring within its scope pipe 
lines that although not technically common carriers yet were 
carrying all oil offered, if only the offerers would sell at their 
price.48 
                                                                 
 44. Id. at 411. 
 45. 70 FERC P61,035 at 61,111(quoting The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 
(1914)). 
 46. 21 FERC P61,260 (1982). “[The ICC] fashioned a special system for oil 
pipelines. That system differed materially from and was far more indulgent to the 
regulatees than the agency’s railroad and motor-carrier methodologies. The salient 
feature of the ICC’s oil pipeline jurisprudence was its permissiveness.” Id. at 61583. 
 47. Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 329 U.S. 29, 33 (1946) (holding that 
the ICC can order oil pipeline company to provide rates, treating the oil pipeline as 
a common carrier without deciding on the common carrier status.) 
 48. United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290, 297-98 (quoting The 
Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 560 (1914)). 
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This analysis of why the ICA coined all oil pipelines common 
carriers shows that the ICA’s designation of oil pipelines as common 
carriers should not have any bearing on whether an oil pipeline is a 
common carrier for purposes of eminent domain. 
While oil pipeline rate regulation is now handled by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), there has been a shift to 
opening contract carriage, or private carriage, to new pipelines and 
limiting the common carrier obligations, as pipelines are often 
essentially used by a single company.49 These long-term private 
contracts bypass the notion of a common carrier for hire, which is the 
original reason some states allow siting of oil pipelines, and the reason 
some states allow oil pipelines the power of eminent domain as a 
“public use.”50 
B. Eminent Domain for Electric Utility Companies 
Like common carriers, electric utility companies have the power of 
eminent domain as they provide an essential public use. In the early 
1900s, many municipalities vied for the ownership of utility 
companies to provide lower rates to their constituents. However, in the 
1920s just sixteen private companies controlled more than 75% of 
power generation in the United States.51 The structure of energy 
transmission was mostly regional, with transmission lines often 
crossing state lines.52 This led the Supreme Court to hold that states’ 
regulation of interstate electricity sales violated the Commerce 
Clause.53 Soon after, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) 
                                                                 
 49. Jeff D. Makholm & Laura T. W. Olive, The Politics of U.S. Oil Pipelines: 
The First Born Struggles to Learn from the Clever Younger Sibling, 37 ENERGY L. 
J. 409, 425-26 (2016). 
 50. Id. at 426. See also Oxy Midstream Strategic Development, LLC 141 FERC 
P61,005 at P8 (2012), Kinder Morgan Pony Express Pipeline LLC, 141 FERC 
P61,249 at P10 (2012). 
 51. Alexandra Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional Approach 
to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1914 (2015). 
 52. Failure to Act: The Economic Impact of Current Investment Trends in 
Electricity, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 4 (2011), http://www.asce.org/
uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_Initiatives/Infrastructure/
Content_Pieces/failure-to-act-electricity-report.pdf. 
 53. See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 
(1927). 
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to grant authority to the federal government54 to regulate interstate 
energy rates.55 Nevertheless, States retain power over the siting of 
transmission lines – including interstate transmission lines – that 
consists of the power to grant electric utility companies a designation 
as a “public use” for eminent domain authority.56 
One exception to the state-regulated siting of electric utilities is for 
natural gas pipelines. As with electrical transmission lines, the industry 
operated largely unregulated and unchecked so multiple states 
attempted to exert jurisdiction over interstate natural gas pipelines.57 
The natural gas industry eventually fell under Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) scrutiny because of the potential to 
monopolize on a public utility.58 Around the same time, the Supreme 
Court thwarted state attempts at self-regulation, again holding that 
interstate rate regulation by the states violated the Commerce Clause.59 
Under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) enacted in 1938, FERC was 
tasked with the regulation of natural gas as a utility and not as a 
common carrier. The Act passed even though natural gas pipeline 
companies lobbied against it.60 The NGA gives eminent domain power 
to natural gas pipelines that receive a certificate of public convenience 
from FERC.61 States may intervene in the certification process through 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) reviews. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) often delegates NEPA 
review to the relevant state environmental authorities. Because natural 
                                                                 
 54. When enacted in 1935, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) created the Federal 
Power Commission (“FPC”), which later became the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”). Klass, supra note 51, at 1914. 
 55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-825r (2014), “Federal Power Act.” 
 56. Klass, supra note 51, at 1916. 
 57. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead 
to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L. J. 57, 61 (2004). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kan. Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307 
(1924) (holding that transportation of natural gas from one state to another is 
interstate commerce and therefore not local to either state); see also Pennsylvania v. 
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 597 (1923) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a 
state producing natural gas to prefer consumers in its state than consumers in another 
state). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (2014); see also Alexandra B. Klass & Daniella 
Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 947, 995 (2015). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2014). 
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gas pipelines must comply with NEPA before receiving a certificate of 
public convenience, the NEPA process affords states an opportunity to 
participate.62 
C. Public Use Doctrine as Applied to Public-Private Takings 
A different, more controversial, jurisprudence exists for 
government-sanctioned projects that transfer property from one 
private party to another private party when neither party is a common 
carrier or utility company. The government cannot take property from 
one private landowner and transfer it to another private party without 
a public purpose.63 However, governments have granted land to private 
entities for the economic redevelopment of blighted areas and other 
large infrastructure projects that benefit the public in a tangential way, 
even though such projects directly benefit the private entity that 
ultimately gains control of the land.64 
The landmark 2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London, marked 
the Supreme Court’s determination that “public use” should be defined 
broadly. Yet, the decision was not a complete change in judicial 
interpretation.65 As early as 1954, the Supreme Court signaled a broad 
understanding of the term “public use” in Berman v. Parker.66 In 
Berman, the Court held that Congress’ decision to redevelop a blighted 
area in Washington, D.C. constituted a public use.67 Illustrating that 
eminent domain was merely a means to an end, the Court defined the 
“concept of public welfare [as] broad and inclusive.”68 In 1984, 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff again signaled the Court’s 
broadening interpretation of public use when the Court sanctioned the 
use of eminent domain to give land from the monopolizing landowners 
to renters, essentially transferring the land from one private landowner 
                                                                 
 62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b-1, 717f(c) (2014). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend V. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 
(2005). 
 64. See, e.g., N.R. Kleinfeld, Opponents of Atlantic Yards are Exhausted by a 
Long, Losing Battle, N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/11/26/nyregion/exhausted-from-an-angry-and-losing-battle-against-barclays-
center.html. 
 65. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 66. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 33. 
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to another.69 In a majority opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, the Court expanded the limits of “public use,” writing “it is 
not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable 
portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order 
for it to constitute a public use.”70 These cases adopted a rational basis 
standard of review, meaning the court defers to the legislative 
determination “until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”71 
State courts followed the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of 
“public use,” deferring to state legislative determinations. For 
example, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held a sufficient “public use” existed for 
General Motors to construct a new manufacturing facility in place of a 
neighborhood because of the economic benefits it would bring to the 
community.72 Scholars concluded that in deferring to the government 
and finding a “public use” in most circumstances, courts were 
“effectively imposing no check on the use of the eminent domain 
power.”73 In 2004, the Michigan Supreme court overturned the 1981 
Poletown decision that permitted General Motors to use eminent 
domain, instead announcing that granting a private company eminent 
domain power violated the state constitution.74 
The protection awarded to Michigan landowners against takings by 
a private company gave hope to other concerned landowners, as the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo later that same year. 
However, when the Supreme Court announced the Kelo decision in 
2005, it did not extend the same protections to landowners as the 
Michigan Supreme Court did in 2004. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme 
Court allowed the taking of private land for an economic development 
project, which was ultimately sold to other private entities.75 The Court 
                                                                 
 69. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 70. Id. at 244, (quoting Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 
(1923)). 
 71. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240, (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 
U.S. 55, 66 (1925)). 
 72. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 
1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 73. Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 495 (2006). 
 74. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
 75. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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leaned heavily on its earlier decisions in Berman and Midkiff, 
announcing again that deference should be given to government 
determinations of “public use.”76 In this case, the “public use” was an 
increase in tax revenue and job creation through the development of a 
generally blighted area.77 The majority held the “public use” did not 
have to be literal, that public purpose was to be understood broadly.78 
The holding of the case does not mean that every possible taking by a 
private party can be justified. Indeed, the Court stated some private 
transfers may “risk . . . undetected impermissible favoritism of private 
parties” where a presumption of invalidity could be warranted.79 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Conner warned, “all private 
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another 
private owner, so long as it might be upgraded – i.e., given to another 
owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public – in the process.”80 Justice O’Connor wrote 
that the decision stands in contrast to Court’s prior holdings that “a 
purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use 
requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and 
would thus be void.”81 She concluded that the majority’s decision has 
“delete[d] the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.”82 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo, many state legislatures 
altered the definition of “public use” to limit the scope of constitutional 
takings, thereby protecting landowners in their state from takings by 
private parties.83 In contrast, some states have used economic 
development as a “public use” to virtually create new cities out of 
blighted areas, using eminent domain to fashion new urban 
                                                                 
 76. Id. at 480-82. 
 77. Id. at 474. 
 78. Id. at 480. 
 79. Id. at 493 (Kennedy J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 494. 
 81. Id. at 500 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 
(1984)). 
 82. Id. at 494. 
 83. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to 
Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2120 (2009); see, e.g., Ala. Const. § 23 (prohibiting 
eminent domain for purposes of generating tax revenue or for “forced subscription” 
to corporations). 
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accomplishments.84 Because eminent domain for oil pipelines is 
regulated on a state-by-state basis, an individual state’s legislation that 
restricts the scope of “public use” would apply rather than the broad 
federal definition. While some states limited the scope of “public use” 
through legislation, many state legislatures either did not address the 
definition of “public use” or did not contemplate whether oil pipeline 
siting could qualify as an exception, and as Section III addresses a 
proposed federal regulation for siting oil pipelines, the federal 
definition of “public use” could determine the power, or lack thereof, 
of oil pipelines to use eminent domain in those states.85 
II. CONFLICT OF EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER STATE LAWS 
As private entities, oil companies’ use of eminent domain is not 
regulated by federal statute. To obtain land to build oil pipelines, 
companies must either contract privately with landowners or receive 
designation as a common carrier or energy utility by a state, enabling 
them to use eminent domain. States differ in their approach to granting 
oil pipelines the power of eminent domain. Some states heavily 
regulate the siting process, some allow oil companies nearly unlimited 
access to land, and others refuse to allow oil companies the use of 
eminent domain to build pipelines. Because the federal government 
only regulates the rates of oil transported by pipeline and not the siting 
process, state-specific laws conflict. This causes uncertainty for 
landowners seeking a remedy to the threat of an oil company taking 
their land. 
This Section describes the legal structure at the state level 
surrounding the use of eminent domain for siting oil pipelines. This 
Section first discusses states that regulate oil pipelines as common 
carriers. Next, this Section turns to states that regulate oil pipelines as 
public utilities. Finally, this Section considers states that either do not 
allow oil pipelines to use eminent domain or have created a hybrid 
structure for regulating oil pipelines. 
                                                                 
 84. See, e.g., DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS BY THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
PURSUANT TO EDPL SECTION 204 WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN PROPERTY TO BE 
ACQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NO. 7 SUBWAY EXTENSION – HUDSON YARDS 
REZONING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. 
 85. See infra, § III.C. 
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A. States Granting Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines as a Common 
Carrier 
Texas is most well-known for its connection to the oil business and 
its laws are relatively broad to facilitate its booming oil industry. Prior 
to 2012, pipeline companies were able to appropriate land through 
eminent domain by receiving a Railroad Commission permit and filing 
a tariff setting rates, proving the company was a common carrier.86 In 
2011, the state amended the Texas Property Code to further protect 
property owners from unconstitutional takings.87 The condemning 
party must have first made a “bona fide offer” to the landowners that 
gave a 30-day period for the landowner to accept, followed by a final 
written offer that includes the Landowner’s Bill of Rights and the 
appraisal report to support the compensation offered.88 The 2012 Texas 
Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC 
became a landmark decision for Texas wherein the Texas Supreme 
Court held that more was required of pipeline companies to prove 
common carrier status as a matter of law.89 This decision responded to 
the Railroad Commission’s “rubber stamp” policy, which approved all 
oil pipelines in Texas without a thorough review to ensure that they fit 
within the state’s definition of a common carrier.90 
In Nebraska, landowners protested the TransCanada Keystone XL 
Oil Pipeline’s use of eminent domain through their state and sued, 
alleging a state law allowing eminent domain for “major oil pipelines” 
was unconstitutional.91 This law, L.B. 1161, allowed the Keystone XL 
pipeline to use eminent domain upon approval by the Governor, an 
approval usually made by the Public Service Commission, which has 
jurisdiction over common carriers. According to Nebraska common 
law, a common carrier’s offering of services to the general public is 
“not always relevant to determining whether it is a common carrier.”92 
                                                                 
 86. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 381 
S.W.3d 465, 465-67 (Tex. 2012) (addressing the common-carrier status of oil 
pipelines while resolving a question of carbon dioxide pipelines). 
 87. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.0113 (2011). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. See Thomas J. Forestier, Jamie Lavergne Bryan, & Larence M. “Trey” 
Lansford III, Feature: What’s in the Pipeline?, 79 TEX. B.J. 218, 219 (2016). 
 90. See Forestier et al., supra note 89. 
 91. Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 (2015). 
 92. Id. at 835. 
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The court held that per the definition of common carrier in Nebraska, 
“an oil pipeline carrier is a common carrier if it holds itself out as 
willing to transport oil products for a consideration to all oil producers 
in the area where it offers its transportation services.”93 The majority 
wrote that “[u]nder the Nebraska Constitution’s limitation on the 
power of eminent domain, pipeline carriers can take private property 
only for a public use.”94 They warned that under L.B. 1161, the 
Governor could potentially approve a project that was instead for 
private use, which would be unconstitutional.95 
Although the court found L.B. 1161 unconstitutional because it 
allowed the Governor to approve the pipeline route, the law was not 
struck down. Nebraska’s constitution requires a supermajority vote for 
constitutional challenges to a statute, and because only four judges 
signed onto the majority opinion, the requirement was not met.96 The 
majority also found that the Governor’s approval of the Keystone XL 
Pipeline was unconstitutional, but the future of Keystone XL in 
Nebraska remains unclear.97 The court’s holding exposes the problems 
inherent in regulating oil pipelines as a common carrier: the pipeline 
company may receive the eminent domain power of a common carrier 
while in reality providing no public use. 
B. States Granting Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines as a Utility 
In Iowa, oil pipelines are granted the right of eminent domain to 
“promote the public convenience and necessity” under Iowa Code 
Section 479B.9.98 Iowa was one of the last states to rule on the Dakota 
Access Pipeline’s route, when landowners challenged Dakota Access, 
                                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 845. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 847-48. See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2. Four judges signed onto the 
majority opinion, one judge did not participate, and three judges dissented in part 
and concurred in the result. 
 97. See Mitch Smith, Risen from the Grave, Keystone XL Pipeline Again Divides 
Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017). Because the Keystone XL Pipeline required 
a Presidential Permit and was denied under the Obama administration, TransCanada 
had to re-submit for approval by the Nebraska PSC when President Trump granted 
a Presidential Permit for the same pipeline. Id. 
 98. IOWA CODE § 479B.9 (2017); Lamb v. Iowa Utilities Board, No. 
CVCV051997 *17 (Iowa District Court for Polk County 2017) 
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LLC’s (“Dakota”) authority to use eminent domain. Landowners 
brought multiple claims alleging that: (1) there was no public 
necessity, (2) economic impact should not be a factor in deciding the 
proposed pipeline, and (3) Dakota showed no “service to public” in 
Iowa.99 Because the Dakota Access Pipeline was sited to run through 
Iowa with no “on ramp” or “off ramp,” the landowners argued that 
Iowa should not grant Dakota the power of eminent domain, as the 
public would not be granted any use.100 The court did not agree and 
deferred to the Iowa Utilities Board, which stated the economic and 
safety benefits of the pipeline outweighed the cost to the 
landowners.101 
Michigan also regulates pipelines as public utilities, allowing oil 
pipelines “the right to condemn property by eminent domain . . . to 
transport crude oil or petroleum [or] to locate, lay, construct, maintain, 
and operate pipelines.”102 The Michigan Public Service Commission 
approves construction of new pipelines, and Michigan courts 
recognize that oil pipelines are a public utility, qualifying as a public 
use.103 In Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, the Michigan Supreme 
Court held that an oil pipeline was a public use, whether or not the oil 
company constructing the pipeline conducted its business in 
Michigan.104 The Court found that “the private benefit, if such there is, 
is merely incidental to the main purpose.”105 
C. States Denying Eminent Domain to Oil Pipelines 
Colorado does not grant the power of eminent domain to oil 
pipelines. In a landowner suit against Sinclair Oil Company, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that a Colorado statute that conveys 
                                                                 
 99. Lamb v. Iowa Utilities Board at *17-18. 
 100. Id. An “on-ramp” or “off-ramp” is a section of the pipeline that would receive 
oil from or distribute oil to the state. 
 101. Steve Davies, Iowa Farmers to Appeal After Losing Dakota Access Pipeline 
Challenge, AGRIPULSE (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/8946-
iowa-farmers-to-appeal-after-losing-dakota-access-pipeline-challenge. The Iowa 
Utilities Board found that approximately 25 long term jobs would result from the 
Dakota Access Pipeline, directly or indirectly. Id. at 20. 
 102. 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 16 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 438.2(1) (2014)). 
 103. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. 1954). 
 104. Id. at 911. 
 105. Id. 
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the authority of eminent domain to any “pipeline company,” did not 
apply to oil pipelines.106 The court found that other sections granting 
the power of eminent domain for pipeline maintenance specifically 
referred to pipeline used for “the transmission of power, water, air or 
gas.”107 Therefore, the court reasoned that the General Assembly 
“intended to authorize eminent domain power for the construction of 
electric power infrastructure.” Because the legislature did not 
“expressly or by clear implication” grant oil pipelines the power of 
eminent domain, oil pipelines did not possess that power.108 
In Georgia, the Department of Transportation Commissioner denied 
a request for a certificate of public necessity from Kinder Morgan, an 
oil pipeline company proposing a $1 billion oil pipeline through 
Georgia and South Carolina.109 Kinder Morgan challenged the 
decision, but the Commissioner’s decision was upheld in state court.110 
The court held that the Commissioner’s finding that “the proposed 
pipeline would not serve a public convenience and a public necessity” 
was supported by a downward trend in fuel consumption and the 
possibility for a decrease in competition in the area.111 The Georgia 
General Assembly then passed a bill preventing pipeline companies 
from exercising eminent domain until 2017, allowing the General 
Assembly time to consider recommendations from a study.112 
Representative Don Parsons authored House Bill 413, which is a 
compromise between environmentally conscious or property 
protective landowners and oil pipelines. The Bill creates a two-step 
process for surveying and acquiring land through eminent domain 
proceedings.113 First, oil companies apply for a certificate of need from 
                                                                 
 106. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-5-105 (2013); Larson v. Sinclair Transp. Co., 284 
P.3d 42, 45 (Co. 2012). 
 107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-4-102 (2013). 
 108. Larson v. Sinclair Transportation Co., 284 P.3d 42, 45 (Co. 2012). 
 109. Keith Goldberg, Kinder Morgan Halts $1B Ga. Pipeline Amid Land Grab 
Ban, LAW 360 (Mar. 31, 2016). 
 110. Palmetto Products Pipe Line LLC v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., Civil Action File 
No. 2015CV262194 (Super Ct. of Fulton Cty. State of Ga. 2016). 
 111. Id. at *6. 
 112. O.C.G.A. § 22-3-85 (2016). 
 113. 2017 Ga. Laws 263. 
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the Georgia Department of Transportation.114 Second, Georgia’s 
Environmental Protection Division must grant a permit for the oil 
pipeline.115 This compromise allows Georgia to deny a pipeline the 
right of eminent domain from two perspectives: economic and 
environmental. First, the economic or public necessity of an additional 
pipeline can be dispelled through a showing of declining oil usage. 
Alternatively, the environmental harm can be shown by the potential 
for oil spills to pollute water, natural resources, and wildlife. 
In South Carolina, the state legislature passed a similar bill to 
Georgia’s General Assembly bill, placing a three-year moratorium on 
“for-profit pipeline companies” exercising eminent domain power.116 
South Carolina historically conferred the same duties and 
responsibilities of telegraph and telephone companies onto pipeline 
companies.117 Prior to the enactment of the bill, South Carolina 
Attorney General Alan Wilson’s office issued an opinion stating his 
“substantial doubt” that the legislature intended to extend to private 
petroleum or oil companies the power of eminent domain.118 The bill 
excludes oil pipelines from “public utility” companies, distinguishing 
oil pipelines from natural gas pipelines and water pipelines.119 
While both bills were only temporary stays on the oil companies’ 
power of eminent domain, the combined actions of the Georgia and 
South Carolina legislatures led Kinder Morgan to halt its planned 
project completely.120 Even now that Georgia’s compromise bill has 
passed,121 opening the conversation to state legislatures proved a 
useful tool for protecting Georgia’s preferences. Indeed, it was enough 
to stop Kinder Morgan, which explained that the project was halted 
                                                                 
 114. Mary Landers, Georgia Lawmakers Pass Compromise Pipeline Bill, 
SAVANNAH NOW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://savannahnow.com/news/2017-03-
31/georgia-lawmakers-pass-compromise-pipeline-bill. 
 115. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-2-2 (2016). 
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due to “unfavorable action by the Georgia Legislature regarding 
eminent domain authority and permitting restrictions.”122 
III. A SOLUTION TO OIL PIPELINE SITING REGULATION 
The conflicting laws surrounding oil pipeline companies’ use of 
eminent domain are inefficient. Landowners, environmentalists, state 
and local regulators, and even oil pipeline companies struggle to 
understand with any certainty whether a pipeline siting will be 
approved or denied and whether private land will be taken through 
eminent domain. While some states approve nearly every pipeline 
siting,123 other states regulate heavily, which can deter pipelines from 
siting in that state.124 Environmentalists opposing new pipelines may 
support existing state-by-state regulation because in heavily-regulated 
states, oil pipeline companies are less eager to develop new pipelines. 
There are, however, two major drawbacks. First, in states with hardly 
any checks on oil companies’ power, private land is subject to taking 
by eminent domain and the potential for environmental harm is 
increased. Second, the patchwork of conflicting state laws 
disincentives the use eminent domain for more justified public uses 
such as renewable energy sources. This is so because states with strict 
regulations on eminent domain block both oil pipeline companies and 
renewable energy companies.125 
This Section first explains why the federal government should 
regulate oil pipeline companies’ use of eminent domain. Next, this 
Section explores why the “pubic use” doctrine should be limited as 
applied to oil pipeline. Specifically, this Section argues that oil 
pipelines should be regulated differently than common carriers or 
public utilities. Moreover, although oil pipeline companies could 
                                                                 
 122. Robert Walton, Kinder Morgan halts Palmetto Pipeline project over Georgia 
proposed pipeline moratorium, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/kinder-morgan-halts-palmetto-pipeline-project-
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 123. Jeff Mosier, Latest Ruling on Eminent Domain Eases Fears of Texas Pipeline 
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 124. Landers, supra note 114. 
 125. See Alexandra Klass, The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: A Regional 
Approach to Siting Transmission Lines, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1914 (2015). 
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arguably qualify as a “public use” under Kelo, this Section suggests 
that this judicial solution is inadequate because it does not address 
important underlying issues such as possible environmental 
degradation, property rights, and the need for a shift to renewable 
energy. Finally, this Section proposes an alternative option for federal 
oil pipeline regulation: new legislation that gives a federal agency 
authority to regulate oil pipeline siting under a two-step permitting 
process. This cooperative federalism solution would mandate state-
level environmental permits and a clear showing of public need at the 
federal level prior to an oil companies’ use of eminent domain. 
Ultimately, such a process would allow states to deny an oil pipeline 
siting if warranted while retaining the ability to grant eminent domain 
to those energy projects found to produce real public benefit. At the 
very least, this solution would allow a baseline of environmental 
protection, and the clear showing of public necessity would best 
balance the needs of the nation, of the states, and of individual 
landowners. 
A. A Federal, Rather than State, Solution under the Commerce 
Clause 
Because states regularly deal with land use issues,126 the federal 
government has largely left siting to the states. However, “energy 
policy relies heavily on the coordination of state and local 
governments.”127 Because state and local governments are completely 
uncoordinated in the oil pipeline siting process, neither landowners nor 
oil companies can adequately prepare or anticipate consistency. In 
considering the Commerce Clause in connection with the Supremacy 
Clause, the issue of pipeline siting lends itself to federal regulation. 
Major pipelines often cross state boundaries, making them similar to 
railroads, which are federally regulated, or to natural gas, which is also 
federally regulated.128 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[w]here the 
                                                                 
 126. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (“Regulation 
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[State] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”129 With oil pipeline companies’ use of eminent domain, state 
statutes do not regulate evenly. Laws along any given pipeline may 
conflict with the regulation of siting. Furthermore, the effects on 
interstate commerce are not merely incidental.130 As such, federal 
intervention is warranted. 
There is a push from scholars to transition to a more regional 
approach for the United States energy grid. A regional approach would 
be more efficient and would also help facilitate a transition to 
renewable energy, which requires regional infrastructure to send 
energy from renewable resources to city centers.131 Such a transition 
could only be completed under a federal structure that facilitates 
cooperation between state governments and other competing interests. 
Federal regulation of oil pipeline siting would not only address the 
regional nature of oil pipeline infrastructure and routes, but also enable 
consideration of the national and regional economic benefits, rather 
than consideration of solely localized benefits. A broader focus on 
national and regional benefits could also open the door to increased 
renewable energy infrastructure. 
B. Under Federal Regulation, Oil Companies’ Power of Eminent 
Domain under the “Public Use” Doctrine Should Be Limited 
While state statutes give oil companies authority to use eminent 
domain to site oil pipelines, no federal agency is equipped to grant this 
same authority. Multiple federal agencies regulate pipelines for a 
variety reasons. For example, the Department of Transportation 
                                                                 
the Indian tribes.”); and U.S. CONST. art. VI, “Supremacy Clause” (giving federal 
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 129. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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regulates pipeline safety through the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (“PHMSA”) and FERC regulates the 
transportation of oil.132 Yet, neither of these agencies currently has the 
capacity or authority to regulate pipeline siting. Only through new 
legislation will consistent, predictable, and protective regulation of oil 
pipelines be accomplished. 
1. Oil Pipelines Are Not Common Carriers 
The nature of oil pipelines is very different from railroads. Although 
in both cases the common carrier designations is used as a mechanism 
of rate regulation to destroy monopolies, this designation should not 
necessarily also transfer eminent domain power.133 As common 
carriers, railroads transport people and goods and must provide service 
upon reasonable request.134 Oil pipelines, on the other hand, are 
cyclical in nature, with large integrated oil companies operating by 
“simply transferring money from one pocket to another.”135 In the 
Williams Pipe Line Company adjudication, FERC analyzed the 
structure of oil companies with regard to pipeline usage, making 
observations that directly oppose oil pipelines’ designation as a 
common carrier. FERC found that “when it comes to transportation, 
the large integrated oil companies are their own best customers.” 
While this analysis is not binding, it highlights that as self-serving 
businesses, oil companies should not receive designation as common 
carriers to declare a public use for eminent domain purposes. 
Numerous investigations into large oil companies have shown no 
monopolization or anti-trust violations.136 Yet, the public service 
provided by railroads starkly contrasts with the stable clientele of 
contracted pipeline users and operators, namely the oil companies 
themselves, which fits squarely within the definition of private 
                                                                 
 132. See PHMSA, DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/; FERC, 
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 133. See supra Section I.A. 
 134. 49 U.S.C. § 11101 (2015). 
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carriers.137 Because oil pipelines do not provide a public service, they 
should not be classified as common carriers. 
2. Oil Pipelines Are Not Public Utilities 
Oil is undoubtedly a source of energy that many Americans, 
especially those who own or drive a car, depend upon. However, this 
does not entitle oil pipelines the same public utility designation as 
electric utilities or even natural gas pipelines. Gasoline is the main 
petroleum product consumed in the United States, and gasoline prices 
are not regulated by the federal government.138 While gasoline is 
heavily used by the United States, it is sold on the free market to 
consumers.139 In contrast, natural gas is more similar to electricity than 
oil in function, providing energy directly to homes and businesses. 
Natural gas is classified as a public utility at the state level as well as 
the federal level,140 as “natural gas has long been the dominant choice 
for primary heating fuel in the residential sector.”141 Because oil is 
more similar to a commodity and not a utility, it should not be 
designated as a public utility. 
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3. Oil Pipelines Are Arguably a “Public Use” 
In her dissent in Kelo, Justice O’Connor feared that distinguishing 
private from public takings would be impossible.142 Because the 
decision in Kelo neither required a literal definition of “public use” for 
a legitimate eminent domain purpose nor an actual “public benefit” 
other than economic revitalization, an oil pipeline regulated at the 
federal level would easily fit under this wide umbrella of “public uses” 
if such a question was litigated. However, litigation would not 
necessarily address important factors such as possible alternatives, 
weighing the costs and benefits, or determining if the community 
would actually benefit from a pipeline. Because no federal agency has 
the authority to regulate oil pipeline siting, this issue could only come 
about if legislation established that authority within an agency. 
C. Proposed Legislation 
Legislation transferring all regulatory authority of oil pipelines – 
from the siting process to the eventual decommissioning – to a federal 
agency would provide consistency and reliability. A two-part approval 
process would ensure baseline environmental protections, while also 
giving protection to landowners. First, the legislation transferring 
power to a federal agency would require a clear showing of public use 
before issuing eminent domain authority. This would give property 
owners more security, as all decisions could be appealed to the 
overseeing regulatory authority.143 While this would, in theory, be less 
protective than state laws that do not currently give eminent domain 
authority to oil pipeline companies, the legislation’s second prong 
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would allow for states to deny a pipeline siting on environmental and 
safety grounds. 
Second, the legislation would impose an environmental permit for 
pipeline siting before allowing the oil company to acquire land through 
eminent domain. This permitting process could be delegated to each 
state’s environmental protection agency as a form of “cooperative 
federalism.” The cooperative federalism model is a collaboration 
between the federal agency and state agency that has been very 
successful in regulating polluters under the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act.144 Permitting at the state level would insulate states from 
federal agency “rubber stamping,” as state reviews and regulations 
could be more protective than the baseline federal standards in the 
proposed legislation. The purpose of these environmental permits 
would be to prevent adverse impacts to state or federal land, water, or 
air quality. These permits would also provide more targeted 
regulations as compared to state or federal environmental assessments, 
which are not currently required for pipeline siting in most states.145 
Further, the environmental permitting process would act as an 
additional safety measure, as environmental aspects of pipeline safety 
currently occur only as reactive measures, for example, when a 
pipeline oil spill threatens surrounding rivers or lakes. While some 
states already implement state environmental assessments, the 
requirement for an environmental permit would provide a baseline 
level of protection for states that do not implement environmental 
reviews for oil pipeline siting. 
Through such a cooperative federalism model where federal, state, 
and local governments work together and regulate equally rather than 
separately,146 states would have a voice in the impact of oil pipeline 
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siting projects. Furthermore, such a model could easily be transferred 
to renewable energy sources, such as intrastate transmission lines that 
bring solar power and wind power to cities, improving the U.S. energy 
infrastructure. Indeed, some scholars note that “green infrastructure,” 
which encompasses renewable energy transmission lines, would be 
impossible without cooperative federalism.147 Under this model state 
agencies could be more protective than the federal baseline for 
nonrenewable energy project citing, yet under the same structure states 
could streamline the process for siting if a renewable energy 
transmission line benefited the state’s constituents or economy. This 
second step of the approval process would also give states an important 
check against the federal government for circumstances where the 
federal plan would harm a state resource or disadvantage the state in 
some other way. Overall, the environmental permit process enables 
greater discussion of land use and energy alternatives. Indeed, the 
proposed legislation would also allow for public comment at both 
stages of the permitting process. The steps could occur simultaneously, 
as the oil pipeline would not gain the power of eminent domain until 
after it receives both permits, similar to the siting process in states such 
as in Iowa.148 
Finally, states could also employ a Cost-Benefit Analysis (“CBA”) 
of the public use and environmental impact of oil pipeline siting and/or 
transmission line siting projects. A CBA would weigh the costs of a 
project, including the use of eminent domain, environmental impacts, 
and the potential negative economic effects, against the benefits of a 
project, including economic stimulation of renewable energy 
development, creation of jobs, tax base increase, and less reliance on 
nonrenewable energy sources that contribute to climate change. CBAs 
give states the opportunity to directly compare giving an oil pipeline 
the power of eminent domain and giving a renewable energy 
transmission line the power of eminent domain. Incorporating CBA 
into this two-step permitting process may make states more willing to 
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grant the power of eminent domain to clean energy projects – where 
the benefits likely outweigh the costs149 – as opposed to rejecting the 
use of eminent domain entirely, even in circumstances where it would 
be desirable. Under the proposed permitting process states can better 
tailor their grants of eminent domain power those projects that will 
actually advance national, regional, and local public purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The controversy over oil pipelines extends beyond their potentially 
harmful environmental impacts and includes the large and contested 
area of law concerning oil companies’ use of eminent domain to 
construct pipelines. While pipeline siting is left to the states to regulate, 
many states have conflicting laws that create uncertainty for both 
landowners and oil companies. Some states grant oil companies the 
power of eminent domain by regulating oil pipelines as public utilities, 
others regulate oil pipelines as common carriers, and some do not grant 
oil companies the power of eminent domain. Even though oil 
companies are private businesses, their use of eminent domain relies 
upon a government finding that oil pipelines qualify as a “public use.” 
Because the “public use” doctrine is not limited in its application, there 
is a strong likelihood that an interstate oil pipeline would arguably 
have a “public use” under the expansive definition. Therefore, the most 
environmentally protective path forward includes federal regulation 
that utilizes state environmental permits in addition to federal siting 
permits, offering states a way to deny oil pipeline siting without losing 
the possibility of using eminent domain for those energy projects that 
actually do advance a public purpose. As technology changes the 
perception of energy, the legal framework surrounding energy 
development will also change. One day, pipelines may be obsolete and 
replaced with new alternative fuels and transportation methods; still, a 
federal regulatory structure would help pave the way forward for 
renewable energy transmission and siting, and give landowners 
consistency and notice, while offering environmental protection 
measures. 
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